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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WADE WAGSTAFF, J 
Petitioner/Appellant, : Case No. 890663-CA 
v. : 
ELDON BARNES, WARDEN, : Priority Three 
UTAH STATE PRISON, 
Respondent. 
B R I E F O F R E S P O N D E N T 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a dismissal of a petition for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, which was filed by petitioner in Third District 
Court and determined by the Honorable Frank G. Noel. This Court 
has jurisdiction in this case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(g) (Supp. 1989) and Rule 65B(i)(10), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether petitioner has supported his allegations 
with adequate citations to the record and the law, and whether he 
has adequately preserved the issues for appeal. 
2. Whether the trial court was misled by counsel for 
the respondent which would entitle petitioner to relief from the 
dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief. 
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
dismissing petitioner's petition for postconviction relief. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah R. Civ, P. 65B(i): 
(1) Postconviction hearings. 
(1) Any person imprisoned in the 
penitentiary or county jail under a 
commitment of any court, whether such 
imprisonment be under an original commitment 
or under a commitment for violation of 
probation or parole, who asserts that in any 
proceedings which resulted in his commitment 
there was a substantial denial of his rights 
under the Constitution of the United States 
or of the state of Utah, or both, may 
institute a proceeding under this rule. 
Such proceedings shall be commenced by 
filing a complaint, together with a copy 
thereof, with the clerk of the court in which 
such relief is sought. The complainant shall 
also serve a copy of the complaint so filed 
upon the attorney general of the state of 
Utah if imprisoned in the state prison, or 
the county attorney of the county where 
imprisoned if in a county jail. Such service 
may be made by any of the methods provide for 
service in Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, or by mailing such copy to the 
attorney general or county attorney by United 
States mail, postage prepaid, and by filing 
with the clerk of said court a certificate of 
mailing certifying under oath that a copy was 
so mailed to the attorney general or county 
attorney. Upon the filing of such a 
complaint, the clerk shall promptly bring the 
same to the attention of the presiding judge 
of the court in which such complaint is 
filed. 
(2) The complaint shall state that the 
person seeking relief is illegally restrained 
of his liberty by the defendant; shall state 
the place where he is so restrained; shall 
state the dates of and identify the 
proceedings in which the complainant was 
convicted and by which he was subsequently 
confined and of which he now complains; and 
shall set forth in plain and concise terms 
the factual data constituting each and every 
manner in which th€* complainant claims that 
any constitutional rights were violated. The 
complaint shall have attached thereto 
affidavits, copies of the same are not 
attached. 
The complaint shall also state whether or 
not the judgment of conviction that resulted 
in the confinement complained of has been 
reviewed on appeal, and if so, shall identify 
such appellate proceedings and state the 
results thereof. 
The complaint shall further state that the 
legality or constitutionality of his 
commitment or confinement has not already 
been adjudged in a prior habeas corpus or 
other similar proceedings; and if the 
complainant shall have instituted prior 
similar proceedings in any court, state of 
federal, within the state of Utah, he shall 
so state in his complaint, shall attach a 
copy of any pleading filed in such court by 
him to his complaint, and shall set forth the 
reasons for the denial of relief in such 
other court. In such case, if it is apparent 
to the court in which the proceeding under 
this rule is instituted that the legality or 
constitutionality of his confinement has 
already been adjudged in such prior 
proceedings, the court shall forthwith 
dismiss such complaint, giving written notice 
thereof by mail to the complainant, and no 
further proceedings shall be had on such 
complaint. 
(3) Argument, citations and discussion of 
authorities shall not be set forth in the 
complaint, but may be set out in a separate 
supporting memorandum or brief if the 
complainant so desires. 
(4) All claims of the denial of any of 
complainant's constitutional rights shall be 
raised in the postconviction proceeding 
brought under this rule and may not be raised 
in another subsequent proceedings except for 
good cause shown therein. 
(5) [Deleted.] 
(6) Within ten days after service of a 
copy of the complaint upon him, the attorney 
general, or the county attorney, as the case 
may be, shall answer the complaint or 
otherwise plead thereto. Any further 
pleadings or amendments shall be in 
conformity with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
(7) When an answer is filed, the court 
shall immediately set the case for a hearing 
within twenty days thereafter unless the 
court in its discretion determines that 
further time is needed. Prior to the hearing, 
the state or county shall obtain such 
transcript of proceedings or court records or 
upon the request of either party, may order a 
prehearing conference if good reason exists 
therefor; but such conference shall not be 
set so as to unreasonably delay the hearing 
on the merits of the complaint. The 
complainant shall be brought before the court 
for any hearing or conference. 
If the court in which the complaint is 
filed determines the case, shall enter 
specific findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and judgment, in writing, and the same 
shall be made a part of the record in the 
case. 
If the court finds in favor of the 
complainant, it shall enter an appropriate 
order with respect to the judgment or 
sentence in the former proceedings and such 
further orders with respect to rearraignment, 
pretrial, custody, bail or discharge as the 
court may deem just and proper in the case. 
(9) If the complainant is unable to pay 
the costs of the proceedings, he may proceed 
in forma pauperis upon the filing of an 
affidavit to that effect, in which event the 
court may direct the costs to be paid by the 
county in which he was originally charged. 
(10) Any final judgment entered upon such 
complaint may be appealed to and reviewed by 
the Supreme Court of Utah as an appeal in 
civil cases. 
R. Utah Ct. App. 24(e): 
(e) References in briefs to the record. 
References shall be made to the pages of the 
original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 
11(b), to pages of the reporter's transcript, 
or to pages of any statement of the evidence 
or proceedings or agreed statement prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References 
to exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. 
If reference is made to the pages of the 
transcript at which the evidence was 
identified, offered, and received or 
rejected, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner, Wade Wagstaff, was convicted on June 30, 
1987, in First District Court, Cache County, of burglary, a 
second degree felony, and assault, a class B misdemeanor (R. 57). 
He subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, the 
subject of this action, in Third District Court, Salt Lake County 
(R. 2). The warden of the Utah State Prison, represented by 
Barbara Bearnson, Assistant Attorney General, filed a motion to 
dismiss (R. 77), to which Petitioner filed a reply (R. 88). The 
matter was heard on August 14, 1989, before the Honorable Frank 
G. Noel. Following argument, the matter was taken under 
advisement, and Judge Noel subsequently granted the warden's 
motion to dismiss (R. 103). Petitioner now appeals the dismissal 
of the petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The procedural aspects of the case set forth in the 
"Statement of the Case" are incorporated in the Statement of 
Facts. Petitioner did not make part of the record on appeal the 
transcript of the August 14, 1989, hearing on the motion to 
dismiss before Judge Noel. 
Additional relevant facts are contained in the 
transcript of the criminal trial held on June 30, 1987 (R. 14-
58). Petitioner failed to appear at trial; he had previously 
failed to report to his parole officer and the state did not know 
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his whereabouts (R. 16). Petitioner's attorney, Herm Olson, was 
present at trial (R. 17) and represented to the court his efforts 
on five or six occasions to notify petitioner of the trial date; 
only one the letters was r€*turned (R. 17-19). Petitioner had, in 
fact, called Mr. Olson to discuss the case sometime between March 
and May (R. 18). Petitioner was obviously aware that the 
criminal proceedings were pending; he would have been present 
during a preliminary hearing and was arraigned in the district 
court on July 28, 1986, and again on October 27, 1986 (R. 21). 
In making its decision to proceed in petitioner's 
absence, the trial court found that petitioner had previously 
been in court on the matter and was, therefore, aware of the 
proceedings, and then discontinued communication with his 
attorney (R. 26). It also found that petitioner voluntarily 
failed to maintain required contact with his parole officer (R. 
27). It further found that the notices sent to petitioner were 
either not received or ignored and that petitioner had made no 
effort to contact either his parole officer or his counsel 
concerning his next required appearance (R. 27). The court found 
that his failure to appear was a voluntary act and allowed the 
state to proceed in his absence (R. 27). His attorney was then 
allowed to withdraw (R. 27). Following presentation of the 
evidence, the jury returned verdicts of guilty. 
Petitioner appealed his subsequently filed motion for 
new trial and arrest of judgment to this Court. In State of Utah 
v. Wade Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), this Court 
affirmed the trial court's judgment. On appeal, petitioner 
claimed that he was not voluntarily absent from trial as the 
result of a "leak" from the county attorney's office regarding 
his agreement to provide information; he claimed this leak 
resulted in his being in fear for his personal safety and, 
therefore, he left the area. He also claimed that he did not get 
actual notice of the trial. This Court noted petitioner's trial 
counsel's attempt to withdraw from representation on March 16, 
1987, because of petitioner's failure to maintain contact with 
him. This Court also discussed trial counsel's numerous attempts 
to notify petitioner of the court dates. This Court further 
noted petitioner's failure to appear for the June 30, 1987 trial, 
although his court-appointed attorney was present. This Court 
held that petitioner failed in his duty to maintain contact with 
his attorney and could not benefit from his claim that he was 
voluntarily absent from his trial. This Court also found 
petitioner's claim that he did not have actual notice to be 
without merit, as Rule 3(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
provides for service upon an attorney representing a party, and 
petitioner had failed in his duty to maintain contact with his 
attorney. 
When dismissing petitioner's petition for 
postconviction relief, Judge Noel found that petitioner was 
represented by counsel ur until his trial date when, because of 
petitioner's failure to cooperate, counsel was allowed to 
withdraw. The court also found that petitioner had voluntarily 
absented himself from trial. The court found that petitioner had 
raised the issues in his direct appeal that he raised in his 
petition for postconviction relief. Specifically, petitioner 
submitted a four-page letter to this Court in which he raised the 
claim that he was denied the right to counsel at trial and that 
appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue 
on appeal. Judge Noel concluded that petitioner's failure to 
appear at trial was voluntary, and that by voluntarily absenting 
himself from the trial and thereby not being available to assist 
counsel in his defense, he could not be heard to complain that he 
was denied counsel. (R. 103, 109-111.) 
Petitioner now claims in his appeal from the dismissal 
of his action that counsel for the state made fraudulent 
misrepresentations to the court and "amended" his cause of 
action. He also claims that the trial court failed to adequately 
examine the record and dismissed his petition in the face of 
constitutional violations. He further claims that the trial 
court erred in dismissing the action on "collateral estoppel" 
grounds. Finally, petitioner claims these errors deprived him of 
equal protection and due process. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Petitioner has failed to properly cite to the record 
and to adequately cite legal authority to support his claims, and 
has failed to preserve the issues for appeal. 
The trial court was adequately informed of the facts at 
trial and was not misled by counsel for the respondent. The 
court had all relevant information at hand when it made its 
decision to dismiss the petition for postconviction relief. 
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The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
dismissing the petition for postconviction relief and 
petitioner's claims are not supported by the record. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
RECORD AND WERE NOT PRESERVED FOR APPELLATE 
REVIEW AND ARE, THEREFORE, NOT PROPERLY 
BEFORE THIS COURT. 
Petitioner's statement of the facts, which is contained 
in the statement of the case section of his brief, does not 
contain a single reference to the record. Not only does he fail 
to cite to the record in support of his contentions, there are 
numerous misrepresentations of fact and references to alleged 
facts that were never made part of the record. As a result of 
petitioner's failures to adequately cite to the record, not to 
mention his misrepresentations of the record, this Court should 
assume the correctness of the judgment of the trial court. R. 
Utah Ct. App. 24(e); Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 
746 P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Further, in order to preserve the issue for appeal, 
petitioner must have lodged an objection before the trial court 
and state specific grounds for the objection. Petitioner failed 
For example, petitioner claims that his appellate counsel made 
an argument before this Court that "misdirected" the court 
regarding his representation at trial by an attorney. 
Petitioner's Opening Brief at 5. He also claims that counsel for 
the state failed to explain the facts to the trial court during 
the hearing on the motion to dismiss. Petitioner's Opening Brief 
at 6. There is nothing in the record to support this claim as 
petitioner did not make the transcript of the hearing part of the 
record on appeal. 
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to object on any ground which he now claims entitles him to 
reversal on appeal. Consequently, this Court should disregard 
his claims and summarily affirm the trial court. Utah R. Evid. 
103; State v. Schreuder# 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986). 
Finally, this Court should summarily affirm the trial 
court's order of dismissal as petitioner's brief is not "concise, 
presented with accuracy . . . and is not free from burdensome, 
irrelevant, immaterial, or scandalous matters." R. Utah Ct. App. 
24(k). His arguments are unintelligible and are not supported by 
relevant legal support. As a result, this Court should disregard 
his claims. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 746 P.2d 
1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD ALL RELEVANT INFORMATION 
BEFORE IT AND THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT A 
CONCLUSION THAT IT WAS MISLED BY RESPONDENT. 
Petitioner claims in Point I on his brief that counsel 
for respondent 
Misconstrued the Actual Cause of Action that 
Petitioner was Denied trial Counsel 
Representation (Simply One Contention), and 
By Fraudulent Mean's [sic] Amended three 
Additional Contentions that, 1, the Court of 
Appeal's [sic] Failed to Address this Issue; 
2, that his Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective 
For his Refusal to Raise this Issue on Direct 
Appeal; and 3, that Petitioner was Denied Due 
Process and Equal Protection of the Law; 
Which She is Simply not at Liberty do Do 
Without Adverse Party Consent. 
Petitioner's Opening Brief at 8-9. He also claims that counsel 
for respondent "Misdirected the Court that Petitioner's Claim was 
Barred By Collateral Estoppel Pre-requisits [sic]." Id. at 9. 
Petitioner provides no citations to the record in support of his 
claim, and his only legal support does not support his argument. 
First, there is no dispute that petitioner was absent 
at trial and that his counsel was allowed to withdraw after 
making an appearance but before evidence was presented by the 
6tate. In the postconviction proceeding, the trial court was 
informed of this situation and had before it not only 
respondent's motion to dismiss and memorandum in support of the 
motion, but many other documents upon which it based its 
conclusion. These documents included all information filed by 
petitioner. For example, the trial court had before it 
petitioner's original petition for postconviction relief and his 
reply to the motion to dismiss (R. 2, 88). Additionally the 
trial court had the transcript of the trial which unequivocally 
establishes the events at trial, including the fact that 
petitioner's counsel was allowed to withdraw (R. 15-58). The 
court also had before it petitioner's letter to this Court in 
which he briefed the lack of trial counsel issue, which this 
Court considered on appeal (R. 64-68), and a copy of this Court's 
opinion in the original appeal (R. 69-75). 
Respondent's motion in support of his motion to dismiss 
was fully supported by the record, case law, and legal argument. 
Given the adequacy of the record the trial court had before it, 
petitioner's unsupported claim that respondent somehow misled or 
committed a fraud upon the court is totally without merit. 
McGarien v. McGarien, 27 Utah 2d 200, 494 P.2d 283 (1972) and 
Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928 (Utah 1980). 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION 
RELIEF. 
Petitioner claims in Point II of his brief that the 
trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the petition for 
postconviction relief by: 1) allowing counsel for respondent to 
commit fraud upon the court as alleged in point I, 2) failing to 
examine the evidence presented by petitioner, 3) dismissing the 
petition for postconviction relief even though there had been 
substantial violations of state and federal constitutional 
provisions, and 4) dismissing the petition "on the grounds of a 
factually erroneous collateral estoppel defense." Appellant's 
Opening Brief at 11-19. 
Petitioner's first assertion can be summarily disposed 
of based upon the argument in Point II of this brief. Petitioner 
has failed to show fraud by respondent. 
Petitioner's second and third assertions can be 
condensed into one for sake of effective argument, since both 
arguments are based upon the erroneous assumption that the trial 
court failed to adequately scrutinize petitioner's position. His 
position appears to be that the only possible explanation for the 
trial court's denial of the petition is that the trial court 
failed to consider his evidence. In reviewing a denial of 
postconviction relief, the Utah Supreme Court has held, 
[W]e survey the record in the light most 
favorable to the findings and judgment; and 
we will not reverse if there is a reasonable 
basis therein to support the trial court's 
refusal to be convinced that the writ should 
be granted." Velasquez v. Pratt, 21 Utah 2d 
_1 O 
229, 232, 443 P.2d 1020, 1022 (1967); see 
also Richardson v. Sullivan, 700 P.2d 534, 
537 (Colo. 1985); Schad v. Turner, 27 Utah 2d 
345, 347, 496 P.2d 263, 264-65 (1972); 
Maxwell v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 163, 165, 435 
P.2d 287, 288 (1967). . . . 
Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988). Likewise, this 
Court in Gomm v. Cook, 754 P.2d 1226, 1228 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987), held that 
"In reviewing a challenge to a trial court's factual findings, we 
apply a 'clearly erroneous' standard. That standard requires that 
'if the findings . . . are against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the findings . . 
will be set aside.'" 
The trial court determined that the petition should be 
dismissed and based its decision upon the following findings: 1) 
Petitioner was represented by counsel up to the date of trial 
when, because of petitioner's lack of cooperation, trial counsel 
was allowed to withdraw, 2) petitioner voluntarily absented 
himself from trial, 3) though appellate counsel did not brief the 
issue of lack of trial counsel, petitioner supplemented the brief 
with a four page letter to the Court of Appeals in which he 
presented legal argument and support for his contention of error, 
and 4) the Court of Appeals found that petitioner was represented 
by counsel but voluntarily absented himself from trial and was, 
therefore, properly tried in absentia (R. 109). The trial court 
also found that by voluntarily absenting himself from trial, and 
thereby not being available to assist counsel in his defense, 
petitioner was not in a position to complain that he was denied 
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the assistance of counsel (R. 110). The record fully supports the 
trial court's dismissal of the petition. Petitioner has failed to 
establish that there was no reasonable basis for the trial court's 
determination or that the decision was "clearly erroneous." 
Petitioner's final claim in Point II of his brief is 
that "the Court's Reliance Upon Erroneous Information in 
Supporting A Collateral Estoppel Bar, and Dismissal was 'manifest 
Error' mandating Reversal. ..." Appellant's Opening Brief at 
19. He, again, asserts that misrepresentations were made to this 
Court at oral argument in the initial appeal, and by counsel for 
respondent during argument on the motion to dismiss the 
postconviction petition. Again, petitioner makes no attempt to 
provide record support for his claim and, in fact, there is none. 
And, again, the issue was not preserved below. As previously 
argued, this, alone, should result in summary denial of his claim. 
Regardless, petitioner's argument is unintelligible. 
Perhaps his argument is that the trial court erred in dismissing 
his petition on the grounds that the issues had been raised on 
direct appeal and were, therefore, barred from review in a 
postconviction proceeding. The trial court did not make this 
specific finding in its decision to dismiss the petition. 
However, such a finding would be legally correct. It is well 
established that postconviction proceedings cannot perform the 
function of regular appellate review. See, e.g., Codianna v. 
Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983); Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816 
(Utah), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980); Rammel v. Smith, 560 
P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977). 
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In petitioner's final argument, set forth in Point III 
of his brief, he essentially restates the arguments made in Points 
I and II and claims that the errors establish a violation of his 
rights to due process and equal protection. The trial court found 
that petitioner's constitutional rights were not violated. 
Petitioner has not established that the trial court's findings of 
fact were clearly erroneous, Gomm v. Cook, 745 P.2d 1226, 1228 
(Utah Ct. App, 1988), or that it abused its discretion in 
dismissing the petition. Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 
1988). Petitioner was not denied due process or equal protection, 
and this Court should affirm the decision of the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly dismissed the petition for 
postconviction relief filed by Wade Wagstaff. For the reasons 
discussed above, and any additional reasons advanced at oral 
argument, the respondent requests that this Court affirm the 
decision of the trial court. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ;3 r Uay of March, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
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